Configuration is backed by xml files in /etc/firewalld and /usr/lib/firewalld instead of the brittle pile of sticks that is the ufw rules files. Use the nftables backend unless you have your own reasons for needing legacy iptables.
Specifically for docker it is a very common gotcha that the container runtime can and will bypass firewall rules and open ports anyway. Depending on your configuration, those firewall rules in OP may not actually do anything to prevent docker from opening incoming ports.
Newer versions of firewalld gives an easy way to configure this via StrictForwardPorts=yes in /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.
If you can, do not expose ports like this 8080:8080, but do this "192.168.0.1:8080:8080" so its bound to a private IP. Then use any old method expose only what you want to the world.
In my own use I have 10.0.10.11 on the vm that I host docker stuff. It doesn't even have its own public IP meaning I could actually expose to 0.0.0.0 if I wanted to but things might change in the future so it's a precaution. That IP is only accessible via wireguard and by the other machines that share the same subnet so reverse proxying with caddy on a public IP is super easy.
one thing I always forget about, is that you have a whole network of 127.0.0.0/8 , not just one IP.
So you can create multiple addresses with multiple separate "domains" mapped statically in /etc/hosts, and allow multiple apps to listen on "the same" port without conflicts.
Rootless exists in Docker, yes, but as OP said, it's not first-class. The setup process is clunky, things break more often. In podman it just works, and podman is leading with features like quadlets, which make docker services just services like any other.
That page does not address rootless Docker, which can be installed (not just run) without root, so it would not have the ability to clobber firewall rules.
it doesn't matter what netfilter frontend you use if you allow outbound connections from any binary.
In order to stop these attacks, restrict outbound connections from unknown / not allowed binaries.
This kind of malware in particular requires outbound connections to the mining pools. Others downloads scripts or binaries from remote servers, or try to communicate with their c2c servers.
On the other hand, removing exec permissions to /tmp, /var/tmp and /dev/shm is also useful.
Do either of them work for container-to-container traffic?
Imagine container A which exposes tightly-coupled services X and Y. Container B should be able to access only X, container C should be able to accesd only Y.
For some reason there just isn't a convenient way to do this with Docker or Podman. Last time I looked into it, it required having to manually juggle the IP addressed assigned to the container and having the service explicitly bind to it - which is just needlessly complicated. Can firewalls solve this?
Personally I find just using nftables.conf straightforward enough that I don't really understand the need for anything additional. With iptables, it was painful, but iptables has been deprecated for a while now.
The problem with firewalld is that it has the worst UX of any program I know. Completely unintuitive options, the program itself doesn’t provide any useful help or hint if you get anything wrong and the documentation is so awful you have to consult the Red Hat manuals that have thankfully been written for those companies that pay thousands per month in support.
It’s not like iptables was any better, but it was more intuitive as it spoke about IPs and ports, not high-level arbitrary constructs such as zones and services defined in some XML file. And since firewalld uses iptables/nftables underneath, I wonder why do I need a worse leaky abstraction on top of what I already know.
Coming from FreeBSD and pf, all Linux firewalls I’ve tried feels clunky _at best_ UX-wise.
I’d love a Linux firewall configured with a sane config file and I think BSD really nailed it. It’s easy to configure and still human readable, even for more advanced firewall gateway setups with many interfaces/zones.
A have no doubt that Linux can do all the same stuff feature-wise, but oh god the UX :/
I’ll just mention Foomuuri here. Its bit of a spiritual successor to shorewall and has firewalld emulation to work with tools compatible with firewalld
Thanks! Would be cool to have it packaged for alpine since firewalld requires D-Bus. There is awall but that's still on iptables and IMO at bit clunky to set up.
> Specifically for docker it is a very common gotcha that the container runtime can and will bypass firewall rules and open ports anyway. Depending on your configuration, those firewall rules in OP may not actually do anything to prevent docker from opening incoming ports.
This sounds like great news. I followed some of the open issues about this on GitHub and it never really got a satisfactory fix. I found some previous threads on this "StrictForwardPorts": https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42603136.
So this is part of the "React2Shell" CVE-2025-55182 issue? I find it interesting that this seems to get so little publicity. Almost like the issue is normal or expected. And it looks like the affected versions go back a little over a year. So if you've deployed anything with Next.js over the last 12 months your web app is now probably part of a million node bot net. And everyone's advice is just "use docker" or "install a firewall".
I'm not even sure what to say, or think, or even how to feel about the frontend ecosystem at this point. I've been debating on leaving the whole "web app" ecosystem as my main employment ventures and applying to some places requiring C++. C++ seems much easier to understand than what ever the latest frontend fad is. /rant
I'm hearing about it like crazy because I deployed around 100 Next frontends in that time period. I didn't use server components though so I'm not affected.
Just a note - you can very much limit cpu usage on the docker containers by setting --cpus="0.5" (or cpus:0.5 in docker compose) if you expect it to be a very lightweight container, this isolation can help prevent one roudy container from hitting the rest of the system regardless of whether it's crypto-mining malware, a ddos attempt or a misbehaving service/software.
Many fail if you do it without any additional configuration. In Kubernetes you can mostly get around it by mounting `emptyDir` volumes to the specific directories that need to be writable, `/tmp` being a common culprit. If they need to be writable and have content that exists in the base image, you'd usually mount an emptyDir to `/tmp` and copy the content into it in an `initContainer`, then mount the same `emptyDir` volume to the original location in the runtime container.
Unfortunately, there is no way to specify those `emptyDir` volumes as `noexec` [1].
I think the docker equivalent is `--tmpfs` for the `emptyDir` volumes.
Readonly and rootless are my two requirements for Docker containers. Most images can't run readonly because they try to create a user in some startup script. Since I want my UIDs unique to isolate mounted directories, this is meaningless. I end up having to wrap or copy Dockerfiles to make them behave reasonably.
Having such a nice layered buildsystem with mountpoints, I'm amazed Docker made readonly an afterthought.
This is true, but it's also easy to set at one point and then later introduce a bursty endpoint that ends up throttled unnecessarily. Always a good idea to be familiar with your app's performance profile but it can be easy to let that get away from you.
The other thing to note is that docker is for the most part, stateless. So if you're running something that has to deal with questionable user input (images and video or more importantly PDFs), is to stick it on its own VM and then cycle the docker container every hour and the VM every 12, and then still be worried about it getting hacked and leaking secrets.
If I can get in once, I can do it again an hour later. I'd be inclined to believe that dumb recycling is not very effective against a persistent attacker.
Most of this is mitigated by running docker in an LXC containers (like proxmox does) which grants a lot more isolation than docker on it's own - closer in nature to running separate VMs.
No firewall! Wow that's brave. Hetzner will let you configure one that runs outside of the box so you might want to add that too, as part of your defense in depth - that will cover you if you make a mistake with ufw. Personally I keep SSH firewalled only to my home address in this way; if I'm out and about and need access, I can just log into Hetzner's website and change it temporarily.
For the record this is only available for their VPS offering and not dedis. If you rent a dedi through their server auction you still need to configure your own firewall.
Firewalls in the majority of cases don't get you much. Yes it's a last line of defense if you do something really stupid and don't even know where or what you configure your services to listen on, but if you don't the difference between running firewalls and not is minuscule.
There are way more important things like actually knowing that you are running software with widely known RCE that don't even use established mechanisms to sandbox themselves it seems.
The way the author describes docker being the savior appears to be sheer luck.
The author mentioned they had other services exposed to the internet (Postgres, RabbitMQ) which increases their attack surface area. There may be vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in those services for example.
But if they have to be exposed then a firewall won't help, and if they don't have to be exposed to the internet then a firewall isn't needed either, just configure them not to listen on non-local interfaces.
I'm not sure what you mean, what sounds dangerous to me is not caring about what services are listening to on a server.
The firewall is there as a safeguard in case a service is temporarily misconfigured, it should certainly not be the only thing standing between your services and the internet.
But the firewall wouldn't have saved them if they're running a public web service or need to interact with external services.
I guess you can have the appserver fully firewalled and have another bastion host acting as an HTTP proxy, both for inbound as well as outbound connections. But it's not trivial to set up especially for the outbound scenario.
No you're right, I didn't mean the firewall would have saved them, but just as a general point of advice. And yes a second VPS running opnSense or similar makes a nice cheap proxy and then you can firewall off the main server completely. Although that wouldn't have saved them either - they'd still need to forward HTTP/S to the main box.
A firewall blocking outgoing connections (except those whitelisted through the proxy) would’ve likely prevented the download of the malware (as it’s usually done by using the RCE to call a curl/wget command rather than uploading the binary through the RCE) and/or its connection to the mining server.
In practice, this is basically impossible to implement. As a user behind a firewall you normally expect to be able to open connections with any remote host.
In this model, hosts don’t need any direct internet connectivity or access to public DNS. All outbound traffic is forced through the proxy, giving you full control over where each host is allowed to connect.
It’s not painless: you must maintain a whitelist of allowed URLs and HTTP methods, distribute a trusted CA certificate, and ensure all software is configured to use the proxy.
I have SSH blocked altogether and use wireguard to access the server. If something goes wrong I can always go to the dashboard and reenable SSH for my IP. But ultimately your setup is just as secure. Perhaps a tiny bit less convenient.
Yup. All my servers are behind Tailscale. The only thing I expose is a load balancer that routes tcp (email) and http. That balancer is running docker, fully firewalled (incl docker bypasses). Every server is behind herzner’s firewall in addition to the internal firewall.
App servers run docker, with images that run a single executable (no os, no shell), strict cpu and memory limits. Most of my apps only require very limited temporary storage so usually no need to mount anything. So good luck executing anything in there.
I used, way back in the day, to run Wordpress sites. Would get hacked monthly every possible way. Learned so much, including the fact that often your app is your threat. With Wordpress, every plugin is a vector. Also the ability to easily hop into an instance and rewrite running code (looking at you scripting languages incl JS) is terrible. This motivated my move to Go. The code I compiled is what will run. Period.
The only way I've envisioned fail2ban to be of any use at all is if you gather IPs from one server and use them on your whole fleet and I got it running like this for a while. Ultimately I decided that all it does is give you a cleaner log file since by definition its working on logs for attacks/attempts that did not succeed. We need to stop worrying about attempts we see in the logs and let software do its job.
> The Reddit post I’d seen earlier? That guy got completely owned because his container was running as root. The malware could: [...]
Is that the case, though? My understanding was, that even if I run a docker container as root and the container is 100% compromised, there still would need to be a vulnerability in docker for it to “attack” the host, or am I missing something?
While this is true, the general security stance on this is: Docker is not a security boundary. You should not treat it like one. It will only give you _process level_ isolation. If you want something with better security guarantees, you can use a full VM (KVM/QEMU), something like gVisor[1] to limit the attack surface of a containerized process, or something like Firecracker[2] which is designed for multi-tenancy.
The core of the problem here is that process isolation doesn't save you from whole classes of attack vectors or misconfigurations that open you up to nasty surprises. Docker is great, just don't think of it as a sandbox to run untrusted code.
I hear the "Docker is not a security boundary." mantra all the time, and IIRC it was the official stance of the Docker project a long time ago, but is this really true?
Of course if you have a kernel exploit you'd be able to break out (this is what gvisor mitigates to some extent), nothing seems to really protect against rowhammer/memory timing style attacks (but they don't seem to be commonly used). Beyond this, the main misconfigurations seem to be too wide volume bindings (e.g. something that allows access to the docker control socket from inside the container, or an obviously stupid mount like mounting your root inside the container).
And not without cause. We've been pitching docker as a security improvement for well over a decade now. And it is a security improvement, just not as much as many evangelists implied.
Not 99%. Many people run an hypervisor and then a VM just for Docker.
Attacker now needs a Docker exploit and then a VM exploit before getting to the hypervisor (and, no, pwning the VM ain't the same as pwning the hypervisor).
Agreed - this is actually pretty common in the Proxmox realm of hosters. I segment container nodes using LXC, and in some specific cases I'll use a VM.
Not only does it allow me to partition the host for workloads but I also get security boundaries as well. While it may be a slight performance hit the segmentation also makes more logical sense in the way I view the workloads. Finally, it's trivial to template and script, so it's very low maintenance and allows for me to kill an LXC and just reprovision it if I need to make any significant changes. And I never need to migrate any data in this model (or very rarely).
Virtual machines are treated as a security boundary despite the fact that with enough R&D they are not. Hosting minecraft servers in virtual machines is fine, but not a great idea if they’re cohosted on a machine that has billions of dollars in crypto or military secrets.
Docker is pretty much the same but supposedly more flimsy.
Both have non-obvious configuration weaknesses that can lead to escapes.
I think you’re missing the point, which was that high value targets adjacent to soft targets make escapes a legitimate target, but in low value scenarios vm escapes aren’t worth the R&D
Firstly, the attacker just wants to mine Monero with CPU, they can do that inside the container.
Second, even if your Docker container is configured properly, the attacker gets to call themselves root and talk to the kernel. It's a security boundary, sure, but it's not as battle-tested as the isolation of not being root, or the isolation between VMs.
Thirdly, in the stock configuration processes inside a docker container can use loads of RAM (causing random things to get swapped to disk or OOM killed), can consume lots of CPU, and can fill your disk up. If you consider denial-of-service an attack, there you are.
Fourthly, there are a bunch of settings that disable the security boundary, and a lot of guides online will tell you to use them. Doing something in Docker that needs to access hot-plugged webcams? Hmm, it's not working unless I set --privileged - oops, there goes the security boundary. Trying to attach a debugger while developing and you set CAP_SYS_PTRACE? Bypasses the security boundary. Things like that.
You really need to use user namespaces to get this kind of security protection -- running as root inside a container without user namespaces is not secure. Yes, breakouts often require some other bug or misconfiguration but the margin for error is non-existent (for instance, if you add CAP_SYS_PTRACE to your containers it is trivial to break out of them and container runtimes have no way of protecting against that). Almost all container breakouts in the past decade were blocked by user namespaces.
Unfortunately, user namespaces are still not the default configuration with Docker (even though the core issues that made using them painful have long since been resolved).
If the container is running in privileged mode you can just talk to the docker socket to the daemon on the host, spawn a new container with direct access to the root filesystem, and then change anything you want as root.
Notably, if you run docker-in-docker, Docker is probably not a security boundary. Try this inside any dind container (especially devcontainers): docker run -it --rm --pid=host --privileged -v /:/mnt alpine sh
I disagree with other commenters here that Docker is not a security boundary. It's a fine one, as long as you don't disable the boundary, which is as easy as running a container with `--privileged`. I wrote about secure alternatives for devcontainers here: https://cgamesplay.com/recipes/devcontainers/#docker-in-devc...
Containers are never a security boundary. If you configure them correctly, avoid all the footguns, and pray that there's no container escape vulnerabilities that affect "correctly" configured containers then they can be a crude approximation of a security boundary that may be enough for your use case, but they aren't a suitable substitute for hardware backed virtualization.
The only serious company that I'm aware of which doesn't understand that is Microsoft, and the reason I know that is because they've been embarrassed again and again by vulnerabilities that only exist because they run multitenant systems with only containers for isolation
Container escapes exist. Now the question is whether the attacker has exploited it or not, and what the risk is.
Are you holding millions of dollars in crypto/sensitive data? Better assume the machine and data is compromised and plan accordingly.
Is this your toy server for some low-value things where nothing bad can happen besides a bit of embarrassment even if you do get hit by a container escape zero-day? You're probably fine.
This attack is just a large-scale automated attack designed to mine cryptocurrency; it's unlikely any human ever actually logged into your server. So cleaning up the container is most likely fine.
There would be, but a lot of docker containers are misconfigured or unnecessarily privileged, allowing for escape.
Also, if you've been compromised, you may have a rootkit that hides itself from the filesystem, so you can't be sure of a file's existence through a simple `ls` or `stat`.
> but a lot of docker containers are misconfigured or unnecessarily privileged, allowing for escape
Honestly, citation needed. Very rare unless you're literally giving the container access to write to /usr/bin or other binaries the host is running, to reconfigure your entire /etc, access to sockets like docker's, or some other insane level of over reach I doubt even the least educated docker user would do.
While of course they should be scoped properly, people act like some elusive 0-day container escape will get used on their minecraft server or personal blog that has otherwise sane mounts, non-admin capabilities, etc. You arent that special.
As a maintainer of runc (the runtime Docker uses), if you aren't using user namespaces (which is the case for the vast majority of users) I would consider your setup insecure.
And a shocking number of tutorials recommend bind-mounting docker.sock into the container without any warning (some even tell you to mount it "ro" -- which is even funnier since that does nothing). I have a HN comment from ~8 years ago complaining about this.
I think a root container can talk to docker daemon and launch additional containers...with volume mounts of additional parts of file system etc. Not particularly confident about that one though
Unintentional vulnerabilities in Docker and the kernel aside, it can only do that if it has access to the Docker API (usually through a bind mount of the Unix socket). Having access to the Docker API is equivalent to having root on the host.
Well $hit. I have been using Docker for installing NPM modules in interactive projects I was testing out. I believed Docker blocked access to the underlying host (my computer).
Thanks for mentioning it - but now... how does one deal with this?
If you didn’t mount docker.sock or any directory above it (i.e. / or /run by default) or run your containers as --privileged, you’re probably fine with respect to this angle. I’d still recommend rootless containers under unprivileged users* or VMs for extra comfort. Qubes (https://www.qubes-os.org/) is good, even if it’s a little clunkier than it could be.
* but if you’re used to bind-mounting, they’ll be a hassle
Edit: This is by no means comprehensive, but I feel compelled to point it out specifically for some reason: remember not to mount .git writable, folks! Write access to .git is arbitrary code execution as whoever runs git.
As sibling mentioned, unless you or the runtime explicitly mount the docker socket, this particular scenario shouldn't affect you.
You might still want to tighten things up. Just adding on the "rootless" part - running the container runtime as an unprivileged user on the host instead of root - you also want to run npm/node as unprivileged user inside the container. I still see many defaulting to running as root inside the container since that's the default of most images. OP touches on this.
For rootless podman, this will run as a user with your current uid and map ownership of mounts/volumes:
>there still would need to be a vulnerability in docker for it to “attack” the host, or am I missing something?
non necessary vulnerability per. se. Bridged adapter for example lets you do a lot - few years ago there were a story of something like how a guy got a root in container and because the container used bridged adapter he was able to intercept traffic of an account info updates on GCP
Docker containers with root have rootish rights on the host machine too because the userid will just be 0 for both. So if you have, say, a bind mount that you play fast and loose with, the docker user can create 0777 files outside the docker container, and now we're almost done. Even worse if "just to make it work" someone runs the container with --privileged and then makes the terminal mistake of exposing that container to the internet.
I believe they meant you could create an executable that is accessible outside the container (maybe even as setuid root one), and depending on the path settings, it might be possible to get the user to run it on the host.
Imagine naming this executable "ls" or "echo" and someone having "." in their path (which is why you shouldn't): as long as you do "ls" in this directory, you've ran compromised code.
There are obviously other ways to get that executable to be run on the host, this just a simple example.
Another example is they would enumerate your directories and find the names of common scripts and then overwrite your script. Or to be even sneakier, they can append their malicious code to an existing script in your filesystem. Now each time you run your script, their code piggybacks.
OTH if I had written such a script for linux I'd be looking to grab the contents of $(hist) $(env) $(cat /etc/{group,passwd})... then enumerate /usr/bin/ /usr/local/bin/ and the XDG_{CACHE,CONFIG} dirs - some plaintext credentials are usually here.
The $HOME/.{aws,docker,claude,ssh}
Basically the attacker just needs to know their way around your OS. The script enumerating these directories is the 0777 script they were able to write from inside the root access container.
regardless of firewalls and best practices and all, i'd just put all sorts of admin-related stuff behind tailscale (or similar), including ssh. hetzner allows you to have ssh closed in your public ip and still open a terminal via the console if ssh-on-tailscale fails. for the web stuff you should do a similar trick. blog and public websites on the public address, while admin stuff goes on tailscale. and if you do it nicely with letsencrypt you can even have nice hostnames pointing to your private stuff.
I am not an expert in incident reaction, but I thought the safe way was to image the affected machine, turn it off, take a clean machine, boot a clean OS image with the affected image mounted read only in a VM, and do the investigation like that ?
Assume that the malware has replaced system commands, possibly used a kernel vulnerability to lie to you to hide its presence, so do not do anything in the infected system directly ?
Maybe if your company infrastructure is affected but not the server you use to host your side projects on with “coolify” unless IT security is your hobby.
That was added as an edit. It does not cover the inaccuracies contained within. It should more realistically say "this article was generated by an LLM and may contain several errors which I didn't bother to find or correct."
I love mining malware - it's reasonably visible and causes almost no damage. Essentially, it's like a bug bounty program that you don't have to manage, doesn't generate costly bullshit reports, and only costs you a few bucks of electricity when a vulnerability is found.
If you have decent network or process level monitoring, you're likely to find it, while you might not realize the vulnerable software itself or some stealthier, more dangerous malware that might exploit it.
I had to nuke my Oracle Cloud box that runs my Umami server. It got hit. Was a good excuse to upgrade version and upgrade all my backup systems etc. Lost a few hours of data while it was returning 500 errors.
Hahaha OP could be in deep trouble depending on what types of creds/data they had in that container. I had replied to a child comment but I figure best to reply to OP.
From the root container, depending on volume mounts and capabilities granted to the container, they would enumerate the host directories and find the names of common scripts and then overwrite one such script. Or to be even sneakier, they can append their malicious code to an existing script in the host filesystem. Now each time you run your script, their code piggybacks.
OTOH if I had written such a script for linux I'd be looking to grab the contents of $(hist) $(env) $(cat /etc/{group,passwd})... then enumerate /usr/bin/ /usr/local/bin/ and the XDG_{CACHE,CONFIG} dirs - some plaintext credentials are usually here.
The $HOME/.{aws,docker,claude,ssh}
Basically the attacker just needs to know their way around your OS. The script enumerating these directories is the 0777 script they were able to write from inside the root access container.
Luckily umami in docker is pretty compartimentalized. All data is in the and the DB runs in another container. The biggest thing is the DB credentials. The default config requires no volume mounts so no worries there. It runs unprivileged with no extra capabilities. IIRC don't think the container even has bash, a few of the exploits that tried to run weren't able to due to lack of bash in the scripts they ran.
Deleting and remaking the container will blow away all state associated with it. So there isn't a whole lot to worry about after you do that.
I find it interesting that the recent trend of moving to self-hosted solutions is sparking this rediscovery of security issues that come with self-hosting. One more time and it will be a cycle!
What trend? All I'm seeing here is further centralisation:
Search engines try to fight slop results with collateral damage mostly in small or even personal websites. Restaurants are happy to be on one platform only: Google Maps. Who needs an expensive website if you're on there and someone posts your menu as one of the pictures? (Ideally an old version so the prices seem cheaper and you can't be pinned down for false advertising.) Open source communities use Github, sometimes Gitlab or Codeberg, instead of setting up a Forgejo (I host a ton of things myself but notice that the community effect is real and also moved away from self hosting a forge). The cherry in top is when projects use Discord chats as documentation and bug reporting "form". Privacy people use Signal en masse, where Matrix is still as niche as it was when I first heard of it. The binaries referred to as open source just because they're downloadable can be found on huggingface, even the big players use that exclusively afaik. Some smaller projects may be hosted on Github but I have yet to see a self-hosted one. Static websites go on (e.g. Github) Pages and back-ends are put on Firebase. Instead of a NAS, individuals as well as small businesses use a storage service like Onedrive or Icloud. Some more advanced users may put their files on Backblaze B2. Those who newly dip their toes in self-hosting increasingly use a relay server to reach their own network, not because they need it but to avoid dealing with port forwarding or setting up a way to privately reach internal services. Security cameras are another good example of this: you used to install it, set a password, and forward the port so you can watch it outside the home. Nowadays people expect that "it just works" on their phone when they plug it in, no matter where they are. That this relies on Google/Amazon and that they can watch all the feeds is acceptable for the convenience. And that's all not even mentioning the death of the web: people who don't use websites anymore the way they were meant (as hyperlinked pages) but work with an LLM as their one-stop shop
Not that the increased convenience, usability, and thus universal accessibility of e.g. storage and private chats is necessarily bad, but the trend doesn't seem to me as you seem to think it is
I can't think of any example of something that became increasingly often self-hosted instead of less across the last 1, 5, or 10 years
If you see a glimmer of hope for the distributed internet, do share because I feel increasingly as the last person among my friends who hosts their own stuff
it's slow, but there are people slowly turning towards a more decoupled internet, the problem is that you still *have* to use cloudflare (or any kind of http proxy), it's just a basic requirement that you can't avoid for anything that people would be interested in keeping offline.
I've been on the receiving end of attacks that were reported to be the size of more than 10tbps I couldn't imagine how I would deal with that if I didn't have a 3rd party providing such protection - it would require millions $$ a year just in transit contracts.
There is an increasing amount of software that attempts to reverse this, but as someone from https://thingino.com/ said: opensource is riddled with developers that died to starvation (nobody donates to opensource projects).
The main reason to use Monero for stuff like this is their mining algo. They made big efforts and changed algorithms several times to make and keep it GPU and ASIC resistant.
If you used the server to mine Bitcoin, you would make approximately zero (0) profit, even if somebody else pays for the server.
But also yes, Monero has technically held up very well.
Enable connection tracking (if it's not already) and keep looking at the conntrack entires. That's a good way to spot random things doing naughty stuff.
I had something similar, but I was lucky enough to catch it myself. I've used SSH for years, and never knew that it - by default - also accepts password logins. Maybe dumb on my part, but there you go...
Criminals and the porn industry are almost invariably early adopters of new technologies. For better or worse their use-cases are proof-of-concepts that get expanded and built on, if successful, by more legitimate industries.
What's considered nowadays the best practice (in terms of security) for running selfhosted workloads with containers? Daemon less, unprivileged podman containers?
And maybe updating container images with a mechanism similar to renovate with "minimumReleaseTime=7days" or something similar!?
As always: never run containers as root. Never expose ports to the internet unless needed. Never give containers outbound internet access. Run containers that you trust and understand, and not random garbage you find on the internet that ships with ancient vulnerabilities and a full suite of tools. Audit your containers, scan them for vulnerabilities, and nuke them from orbit on the regular.
Easier said than done, I know.
Podman makes it easier to be more secure by default than Docker. OpenShift does too, but that's probably taking things too far for a simple self hosted app.
You’ll set yourself up for success if you check the dependencies of anything you run, regardless of it being containerised. Use something like Snyk to scan containers and repositories for known exploits and see if anything stands out.
Then you need to run things with as least privilege as possible. Sadly, Docker and containers in general are an anti-pattern here because they’re about convenience first, security second. So the OP should have run the contains as read-only with tight resource limits and ideally IP restrictions on access if it’s not a public service.
Another thing you can do is use Tailscale, or something like it, to keep things being a zero trust, encrypted, access model. Not suitable for public services of course.
I took issue with this paragraph of the article, on account of several pieces of misinformation, presumably courtesy of Claude hallucinations:
> Here’s the test. If /tmp/.XIN-unix/javae exists on my host, I’m fucked. If it doesn’t exist, then what I’m seeing is just Docker’s default behavior of showing container processes in the host’s ps output, but they’re actually isolated.
1. Files of running programs can be deleted while the program is running. If the program were trying to hide itself, it would have deleted /tmp/.XIN-unix/javae after it started. The nonexistence of the file is not a reliable source of information for confirming that the container was not escaped.
2. ps shows program-controlled command lines. Any program can change what gets displayed here, including the program name and arguments. If the program were trying to hide itself, it would change this to display `login -fp ubuntu` instead. This is not a reliable source of information for diagnosing problems.
It is good to verify the systemd units and crontab, and since this malware is so obvious, it probably isn't doing these two hiding methods, but information-stealing malware might not be detected by these methods alone.
Later, the article says "Write your own Dockerfiles" and gives one piece of useless advice (using USER root does not affect your container's security posture) and two pieces of good advice that don't have anything to do with writing your own Dockerfiles. "Write your own Dockerfiles" is not useful security advice.
As a user of iptables this order makes me anxious. I used to cut myself out from the server many times because first blocking then adding exceptions. I can see that this is different here as the last command commits the rules...
Would "user root" without --privileged and excessive mounts have enabled a container escape, or just exposed additional attack surface that potentially could have allowed the attacker to escape if they had another exploit?
They would need a vulnerability in containerd or the kernel to escape the sandbox and being root in the sandbox would give them more leeway to exploit that vulnerability.
But if they do have a vulnerability and manage to escape the sandbox then they will be root on your host.
Running your processes as an unprivileged user inside your containers reduces the possibility of escaping the sandbox, running your containers themselves as un unprivileged user (rootless podman or docker for example) reduces the attack surface when they manage to escape the sandbox.
If I’m not wrong, a hetzner VM by default has no firewall enabled. If you are coming from providers with different default settings, that might bite you. Containers that you thought were not open to internet have been open all this time. Two firewalls failed: They bypassed ufw and there was no external firewall either.
You have to define a firewall policy and attach it to the VM.
> "No more exposed PostgreSQL ports, no more RabbitMQ ports open to the internet."
Yikes. I would still recommend a server rebuild. That is _not_ a safe configuration in 2025, whatsoever. You are very likely to have a much better engineered persistent infection on that system.
Also, apparently they run an IoT platform for other users on the same host that cannot only visualize sensors, but also trigger (mains-powered) devices.
The right thing to do is to roll out a new server (you have a declarative configuration right?), migrate pure data (or better, get it from the latest backup), remove the attacked machine off the internet to do a full audit. Both to learn about what compromises there are for the future and to inform users of the IoT platform if their data has been breached. In some countries, you are even required by law to report breaches. IANAL of course.
You can run Docker Scout on one repo for free, and that would alert you that something was using Next.js and had that CVE. AWS ECR has pretty affordable scanning too: 9 cents/image and 1 cent/rescan. Continuous scanning even for these home projects might be worth it.
> Here’s the test. If /tmp/.XIN-unix/javae exists on my host, I’m fucked. If it doesn’t exist, then what I’m seeing is just Docker’s default behavior of showing container processes in the host’s ps output, but they’re actually isolated.
/tmp/.XIN-unix/javae &
rm /tmp/.XIN-unix/javae
This article’s LLM writing style is painful, and it’s full of misinformation (is Puppeteer even involved in the vulnerability?).
Seconding what others have said about preferring to read bad human writing. And I don’t want to pick on you – this is a broadly applicable message prompted by a drop in the bucket – but please don’t publish articles beyond your ability to fact check. Just write what you actually know, and when you’re making a guess or you still have open questions at the end of your investigation, be honest about that. (People make mistakes all the time anyway, but we’re in an age where confident and detailed mistakes have become especially accessible.)
Hi Jake! Cool article, and it's something I'll keep in mind when I start giving my self-hosted setup a remodel soon. That said, I have to agree with the parent comment and say that the LLM writing style dulled what would otherwise have been a lovely sysadmin detective work article and didn't make me want to explore your site further.
I'm glad you're up to writing more of your own posts, though! I'm right there with you that writing is difficult, and I've definitely got some posts on similar topics up on my site that are overly long and meandering and not quite good, but that's fine because eventually once I write enough they'll hopefully get better.
You haven't confirmed this (at least from the contents of the article). You did some reasonable spot checks and confirmed/corrected your understanding of the setup. I'd agree that it looks likely that it did not escape or gain persistence on your host but in no way have you actually verified this. If it were me I'd still wipe the host and set up everything from scratch again[0].
Also your part about the container user not being root is still misinformed and/or misleading. The user inside the container, the container runtime user, and whether container is privileged are three different things that are being talked about as one.
[0]: Not necessarily drop-everything-you-do urgently but next time you get some downtime to do it calmly. Recovering like this is a good excercise anyway to make sure you can if you get a more critical situation in the future where you really need to. It will also be less time and work vs actually confirming that the host is uncontaminated.
I did see your comment on Firewall, and you're right about the escape. It seems safe enough for now. Between the hacking and accidentally hitting the front page of HN it's been a long day.
I'm going to sit down and rewrite the article and take a further look at the container tomorrow.
Before rewriting the article, roll out a new server. Seriously. It seems you do not have the skills yet to do a proper audit. It’s better to roll out a pristine server. If that is a lot of work, it is a good moment to learn about declarative system configuration.
At any rate, this happening to you sucks! Hugs from a fellow HN user, I know that things like this can suck up a lot of time and energy. It’s courageous to write about such an incident incident, I think it’s useful to a lot of other people too, kudos!
Hey, thanks for taking the time to share your learnings and engage. I'm sure there are HN readers out there who will be better off for it alongside you!
(And good to hear you're leaving the LLMs out of the writing next time <3)
Something similar happened to me last year, it was with an unsecured user account accessible over ssh with password authentication, something like admin:admin that I forgot about.
At least that's what I think happened because I never found out exactly how it was compromised.
The miner was running as root and it's file was even hidden when I was running ls ! So I didn't understand what was happening, it was only after restarting my VPS from with a rescue image, and after mounting the root filesystem, that I found out the file I was seeing in the processes list did indeed exist.
I wonder in a case like this how hard it would be to "steal" the crypto that you've paid to mine. But I assume these people are probably smart enough to where everything is instantly forwarded to their C&C server to prevent that.
This Monero mining also happened with one of my VPS over at interserv.net, when I forgot to log out of the root console in web-based terminal console to one of my VPS and closed its browser tab instead.
The first step I would take is running podman instead of Docker to prevent container escapes. Podman can be run truly rootless and doesn't mess with your firewall. Next I would drop all caps if possible.
What's the difference between running Podman and running Docker in rootless mode? (Other than Docker messing with the firewall, which apparently OP doesn't know about… yet). I understand Podman doesn't require a daemon, but is that all there is to it, or is there something I'm missing?
The runtime has been designed from the ground up to be run daemonless and rootless. They also have a K8s runtime, that has an extremely small surface, just enough to be K8s compliant.
But podman has also great integration with systemd. With that you could use a socket activated systemd unit, and stick the socket inside the container, instead of giving the container any network at all. And even if you want networking in the container, the podman folks developed slirp4netns, which is user space networking, and now something even better: passt/pasta.
I know we aren't supposed to rely on containers as a security boundary, but it sure is great hearing stories like this where the hack doesn't escape the container. The more obstacles the better I guess.
Hahaha, I did tell him this afternoon. This is the bloke who has the same password for all his banking apps despite me buying him 1password though. The imminent threat from RCE's just didn't land.
Buying someone 1Pass, or the like, and calling it good is not enough. People using password managers forget how long it takes to visit all of the sites you use to create that site's record, then update the password to a secure one, and then log out and log back in with the new password to test it is good. For a lot of people having a password manager bought for them is going to be over it after the second site. Just think about how many videos on TikTok they could have been watching instead
Yeah, mom and I sat down one afternoon and we changed all of her passwords to long, secure ones, generated by 1Password. It was a nice time! It also helped her remember all of the different services she needs to access, and now they're all safely stored with strong passwords. And it was a nice way to connect and spend some time together. :)
As an aside, if you're using a Hetzner VPS for Umami you might be over-specced. I just cut my Hetzner bill by $4/mo by moving my Umami box to one of the free Oracle Cloud VPS after someone on here pointed out the option to me. Depends whether this is a hobby thing or something more serious, but that option is there.
All fine and well, but oracle will threaten to turn off your instance if you don’t maintain a reasonable average CPU usage on the free hosts, and will eventually do so abruptly.
This became enough of a hassle that I stopped using them.
Do you mean if it’s idle, or if it’s maxed out? I’ve had a few relatively idle free-tier VMs with Oracle and I’ve not received any threats of shutoff over the last 3 years I’ve had them online.
I assumed the same, but as long as you keep a credit card on file apparently they will let you idle it too. I went in and set my max budget at $1/mo and set alerts too, just in case.
You might want to harden that those outbound firewall rules as another step. Did the Umami container need the ability to initiate connections? If not, that would eliminate the ability to do the outbound scans.
Also could prevent something to exfiltrate sensitive data.
ASICs do dominate Bitcoin mining but Monero's POW algorithm is supposed to be ASIC resistant. Besides, who cares if it's efficient when it's someone else's server?
Monero's proof of work (RandomX) is very asic-resistant and although it generates a very small amount of earnings, if you exploit a vulnerability like this with thousands or tens of thousands of nodes, it can add up (8 modern cores 24/7 on Monero would be in the 10-20c/day per node range). OPs Vps probably generated about $1 for those script kiddies.
I think so, but it is hard to say. Could be a lot of people with extra power (or stolen power), but their own equipment. I mine myself with waste solar power
This is the PoW scheme that Monero currently uses:
> RandomX utilizes a virtual machine that executes programs in a special instruction set that consists of integer math, floating point math and branches.
> These programs can be translated into the CPU's native machine code on the fly (example: program.asm).
> At the end, the outputs of the executed programs are consolidated into a 256-bit result using a cryptographic hashing function (Blake2b).
I doubt that you anyone managed to create an ASIC that does this more efficiently and cost effective than a basic CPU.
So, no, probably no one is mining Monero using an ASIC.
Yes, for Monero it is the only real viable option. I'd also assume that the OP's instance is one of many other victims whose total mining might add up to a significant amount of crypto.
If the effectiveness of mining is represented as profit divided by the cost of running the infrastructure, then a CPU that someone else is paying for is worth it as long as the profit is greater than zero.
Are you referring to user namespaces and, if so, how does that kind of break out to host root work? I thought the whole point of user namespaces was your UID 0 inside the container is UID 100000 or whatever from the perspective of outside the container. Escaping the container shouldn't inherently grant you ability to change your actual UID in the host's main namespace in that kind of setup, but I'm not sure Docker actually leverages user namespaces or not.
E.g. on my systemd-nspawn setup with --private-users=pick (enables user namespacing) I created a container and gave it a bind mount. From the container it appears like files in the bind mount created by the container namespace's UID 0 are owned by UID 0 but from outside the container the same file looks owned by UID 100000. Inverted, files owned by the "real" UID 0 on the host look owned by 0 to the host but as owned by 65534 (i.e. "nobody") from the container's perspective. Breaking out of the container shouldn't inherently change the "actual" user of the process from 100000 to 0 any more than breaking out of the container as a non-0 UID in the first place - same as breaking out of any of the other namespaces doesn't make the "UID 0" user in the container turn into "UID 0" on the host.
Users in user namespaces are granted capabilities that root has, user namespaces themselves need to be locked down to prevent that, but if a user with root capabilities escapes the namespace, they have the capabilities on the host.
They also expose kernel interfaces that, if exploited, can lead to the same.
In the end, namespaces are just for partitioning resources, using them for sandboxes can work, but they aren't really sandboxes.
This article is very interesting at first but I once again get disappointed after reading clear signs of AI like "Why this matters" and "The moment of truth", and then the whole thing gets tainted with signs all over the place.
Yeah personally I’d much rather read a poorly constructed article with actually interesting content than the same content put into the formulaic AI voice.
>Edit: A few people on HN have pointed out that this article sounds a little LLM generated. That’s because it’s largely a transcript of me panicking and talking to Claude. Sorry if it reads poorly, the incident really happened though!
For what it's worth, this is not an excuse, and I still don't appreciate being fed undisclosed slop. I'm not even reading it.
As others have mentioned, a firewall might have been useful in restricting outbound connections to limit the usefulness of the machine to the hacker after the breach.
An inbound firewall can only help protect services that aren't meant to be reachable on the public internet. This service was exposed to the internet intentionally so a firewall wouldn't have helped avoid the breach.
The lesson to me is that keeping up with security updates helps prevent publicly exposed services from getting hacked.
tl:dr: He got hacked but the damage was only restricted to one docker container runn ing Umami (that is built on top of NextJS). Thankfully, he was running the docker container as a non privileged non-root user which saved him big time considering the fact that the attack surface was limited only within the container and could not access the entire host/filesystem.
Is there ever a reason someone should run a docker container as root ?
If you're using the container to manage stuff on the host, it'll likely need to be a process running as root. I think the most common form of this is Docker-in-Docker style setups where a container is orchestrating other containers directly through the Docker socket.
I also run Umami, but patched once the CVE patch was released. Also, I only expose the tracking js endpoint and /api/send via Caddy publically (though, /api/send might be enough to exploit the vul). To actually interact with Umami UI I use Twingate (similar to Tailscale) to tunnel into the VPC locally.
Unless ran as root this could return file not found because of missing permissions, and not just because the file doesn't actually exist, right?
> “I don’t use X” doesn’t mean your dependencies don’t use X
That is beyond obvious, and I don't understand how anyone would feel safe from reading about a CVE on a widely used technology when they run dozens of containers on their server. I have docker containers and as soon as I read the article I went and checked because I have no idea what technology most are built with.
> No more Umami. I’m salty. The CVE was disclosed, they patched it, but I’m not running Next.js-based analytics anymore.
Yeah, my Umami box was hit, but the time between the CVE disclosure and my box getting smacked was incredibly low. Umami patched it very quickly. And then patched it again a second time when the second CVE dropped right after.
Nothing is immune. What analytics are you going to run? If you roll your own you'll probably leave a hole somewhere.
I still can't believe that there are so many people out here popping boxen and all they do is solve drug sudokus with the hardware. Hacks are so lame now.
Stupid question probably, but: how can it not be routed through a firewall? If you have it at home, it's behind a router that should have a firewall already, right? And just forwards the one port you expose to the server?
Cloudflare can certainly do more (e.g. protect against DoS and hide your personal IP if your server is at home).
Not expose the server IP is one practice (obfuscation) in a list of several options.
But that alone would not solve the problem being a RCE from HTTP, that is why edge proxy provider like Cloudflare[0] and Fastfy[1] proactivily added protections in his WAF products.
Even cloudflare had an outage trying to protect his customers[3].
DNS is no issue. External DNS can be handled by Cloudflare and their waf. Their DNS service can can obsfucate your public IP, or ideally not need to use it at all with a Cloudflare tunnel installed directly on the server. This is free.
Backend access trivial with Tailscale, etc.
Public IP doesn't always need to be used. You can just leave it an internal IP if you really want.
The tunnel doesn't have to use the Public IP inbound, the cloudflare tunnel calls outbound that can be entirely locked up.
If you are using Cloudflare's DNS they can hide your IP on the dns record but it would still have to be locked down but some folks find ways to tighten that up too.
If you're using a bare metal server it can be broken up.
It's fair that it's a 3rd party's castle. At the same time until you know how to run and secure a server, some services are not a bad idea.
Some people run pangolin or nginx proxy manager on a cheap vps if it suits their use case which will securely connect to the server.
We are lucky that many of these ideas have already been discovered and hardened by people before us.
Even when I had bare metal servers connected to the internet, I would put a firewall like pfsense or something in between.
What does the tunnel bring except DoS protection and hiding your IP? And what is the security concern with divulging your IP? Say when I connect to a website, the website knows my IP and I don't consider this a security risk.
If I run vulnerable software, it will still be vulnerable through a Cloudflare tunnel, right?
Genuinely interested, I'm always scared to expose things to the internet :-).
Many ways. Using a "bastion host" is one option, with something like wireguard or tinc. Tailscale and similar services are another option. Tor is yet another option.
Free way - sign up for a cloudflare account. Use the DNS on cloudflare, they wil put their public ip in front of your www.
Level 2 is install the cloudflare tunnel software on your server and you never need to use the public IP.
Backend access securely? Install Tailscale or headscale.
This should cover most web hosting scenarios. If there's additional ports or services, tools like nginx proxy manager (web based) or others can help. Some people put them on a dedicated VPS as a jump machine.
This way using the Public IP can almost be optional and locked down if needed. This is all before running a firewall on it.
Its often possible to lock down the public IP entirely to not accept connections except what's initiated from the inside (like the cloudflare tunnel or otherwise reaching out).
Something like a Cloudflare+tunnel on one side, tailscale or something to get into it on the other.
Folks other than me have written decent tutorials that have been helpful.
I disrecommend UFW.
firewalld is a much better pick in current year and will not grow unmaintainable the way UFW rules can.
Configuration is backed by xml files in /etc/firewalld and /usr/lib/firewalld instead of the brittle pile of sticks that is the ufw rules files. Use the nftables backend unless you have your own reasons for needing legacy iptables.Specifically for docker it is a very common gotcha that the container runtime can and will bypass firewall rules and open ports anyway. Depending on your configuration, those firewall rules in OP may not actually do anything to prevent docker from opening incoming ports.
Newer versions of firewalld gives an easy way to configure this via StrictForwardPorts=yes in /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf.
In my own use I have 10.0.10.11 on the vm that I host docker stuff. It doesn't even have its own public IP meaning I could actually expose to 0.0.0.0 if I wanted to but things might change in the future so it's a precaution. That IP is only accessible via wireguard and by the other machines that share the same subnet so reverse proxying with caddy on a public IP is super easy.
So you can create multiple addresses with multiple separate "domains" mapped statically in /etc/hosts, and allow multiple apps to listen on "the same" port without conflicts.
Same as for docker, yes?
https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless/
Networking is just better in podman.
That page does not address rootless Docker, which can be installed (not just run) without root, so it would not have the ability to clobber firewall rules.
In order to stop these attacks, restrict outbound connections from unknown / not allowed binaries.
This kind of malware in particular requires outbound connections to the mining pools. Others downloads scripts or binaries from remote servers, or try to communicate with their c2c servers.
On the other hand, removing exec permissions to /tmp, /var/tmp and /dev/shm is also useful.
If this weren't the case, plenty of containers could probably have a fully read-only filesystem.
- Configuration management (ansible, salt, chef, puppet)
- Preconfigured images (NixOS, packer, Guix, atomic stuffs)
For a one-off: pssh
Imagine container A which exposes tightly-coupled services X and Y. Container B should be able to access only X, container C should be able to accesd only Y.
For some reason there just isn't a convenient way to do this with Docker or Podman. Last time I looked into it, it required having to manually juggle the IP addressed assigned to the container and having the service explicitly bind to it - which is just needlessly complicated. Can firewalls solve this?
It’s not like iptables was any better, but it was more intuitive as it spoke about IPs and ports, not high-level arbitrary constructs such as zones and services defined in some XML file. And since firewalld uses iptables/nftables underneath, I wonder why do I need a worse leaky abstraction on top of what I already know.
I truly hate firewalld.
I’d love a Linux firewall configured with a sane config file and I think BSD really nailed it. It’s easy to configure and still human readable, even for more advanced firewall gateway setups with many interfaces/zones.
A have no doubt that Linux can do all the same stuff feature-wise, but oh god the UX :/
I mean there are some payload over payload like GRE VPE/VXLAN/VLAN or IPSec that needs to be written in raw nft if using Foomuuni but it works!.
But I love the Shorewall approach and your configuration gracefully encapsulated Shorewall mechanic.
Disclaimer: I maintain vim-syntax-nftables syntax highlighter repo at Github.
This sounds like great news. I followed some of the open issues about this on GitHub and it never really got a satisfactory fix. I found some previous threads on this "StrictForwardPorts": https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42603136.
I'm not even sure what to say, or think, or even how to feel about the frontend ecosystem at this point. I've been debating on leaving the whole "web app" ecosystem as my main employment ventures and applying to some places requiring C++. C++ seems much easier to understand than what ever the latest frontend fad is. /rant
Unless you're running a static html export - eg: not running the nextjs server, but serving through nginx or similar
Unfortunately, there is no way to specify those `emptyDir` volumes as `noexec` [1].
I think the docker equivalent is `--tmpfs` for the `emptyDir` volumes.
1: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/48912
Having such a nice layered buildsystem with mountpoints, I'm amazed Docker made readonly an afterthought.
There are way more important things like actually knowing that you are running software with widely known RCE that don't even use established mechanisms to sandbox themselves it seems.
The way the author describes docker being the savior appears to be sheer luck.
Good security is layered.
Just use a firewall.
The firewall is there as a safeguard in case a service is temporarily misconfigured, it should certainly not be the only thing standing between your services and the internet.
I guess you can have the appserver fully firewalled and have another bastion host acting as an HTTP proxy, both for inbound as well as outbound connections. But it's not trivial to set up especially for the outbound scenario.
In this model, hosts don’t need any direct internet connectivity or access to public DNS. All outbound traffic is forced through the proxy, giving you full control over where each host is allowed to connect.
It’s not painless: you must maintain a whitelist of allowed URLs and HTTP methods, distribute a trusted CA certificate, and ensure all software is configured to use the proxy.
I know port scanners are a thing but the act of using non-default ports seems unreasonably effective at preventing most security problems.
I do it for a really long time already, and until now I am not sure if it has any benefit or it's just umbrella in a sideways storm.
I don't think it's wrong, it's just not the same as eg using a yubikey.
App servers run docker, with images that run a single executable (no os, no shell), strict cpu and memory limits. Most of my apps only require very limited temporary storage so usually no need to mount anything. So good luck executing anything in there.
I used, way back in the day, to run Wordpress sites. Would get hacked monthly every possible way. Learned so much, including the fact that often your app is your threat. With Wordpress, every plugin is a vector. Also the ability to easily hop into an instance and rewrite running code (looking at you scripting languages incl JS) is terrible. This motivated my move to Go. The code I compiled is what will run. Period.
Is that the case, though? My understanding was, that even if I run a docker container as root and the container is 100% compromised, there still would need to be a vulnerability in docker for it to “attack” the host, or am I missing something?
The core of the problem here is that process isolation doesn't save you from whole classes of attack vectors or misconfigurations that open you up to nasty surprises. Docker is great, just don't think of it as a sandbox to run untrusted code.
1. https://gvisor.dev/
2. https://firecracker-microvm.github.io/
Of course if you have a kernel exploit you'd be able to break out (this is what gvisor mitigates to some extent), nothing seems to really protect against rowhammer/memory timing style attacks (but they don't seem to be commonly used). Beyond this, the main misconfigurations seem to be too wide volume bindings (e.g. something that allows access to the docker control socket from inside the container, or an obviously stupid mount like mounting your root inside the container).
Am I missing something?
Attacker now needs a Docker exploit and then a VM exploit before getting to the hypervisor (and, no, pwning the VM ain't the same as pwning the hypervisor).
Not only does it allow me to partition the host for workloads but I also get security boundaries as well. While it may be a slight performance hit the segmentation also makes more logical sense in the way I view the workloads. Finally, it's trivial to template and script, so it's very low maintenance and allows for me to kill an LXC and just reprovision it if I need to make any significant changes. And I never need to migrate any data in this model (or very rarely).
but will not stop serious malware
Docker is pretty much the same but supposedly more flimsy.
Both have non-obvious configuration weaknesses that can lead to escapes.
Second, even if your Docker container is configured properly, the attacker gets to call themselves root and talk to the kernel. It's a security boundary, sure, but it's not as battle-tested as the isolation of not being root, or the isolation between VMs.
Thirdly, in the stock configuration processes inside a docker container can use loads of RAM (causing random things to get swapped to disk or OOM killed), can consume lots of CPU, and can fill your disk up. If you consider denial-of-service an attack, there you are.
Fourthly, there are a bunch of settings that disable the security boundary, and a lot of guides online will tell you to use them. Doing something in Docker that needs to access hot-plugged webcams? Hmm, it's not working unless I set --privileged - oops, there goes the security boundary. Trying to attach a debugger while developing and you set CAP_SYS_PTRACE? Bypasses the security boundary. Things like that.
Unfortunately, user namespaces are still not the default configuration with Docker (even though the core issues that made using them painful have long since been resolved).
I disagree with other commenters here that Docker is not a security boundary. It's a fine one, as long as you don't disable the boundary, which is as easy as running a container with `--privileged`. I wrote about secure alternatives for devcontainers here: https://cgamesplay.com/recipes/devcontainers/#docker-in-devc...
The only serious company that I'm aware of which doesn't understand that is Microsoft, and the reason I know that is because they've been embarrassed again and again by vulnerabilities that only exist because they run multitenant systems with only containers for isolation
Are you holding millions of dollars in crypto/sensitive data? Better assume the machine and data is compromised and plan accordingly.
Is this your toy server for some low-value things where nothing bad can happen besides a bit of embarrassment even if you do get hit by a container escape zero-day? You're probably fine.
This attack is just a large-scale automated attack designed to mine cryptocurrency; it's unlikely any human ever actually logged into your server. So cleaning up the container is most likely fine.
Also, if you've been compromised, you may have a rootkit that hides itself from the filesystem, so you can't be sure of a file's existence through a simple `ls` or `stat`.
Honestly, citation needed. Very rare unless you're literally giving the container access to write to /usr/bin or other binaries the host is running, to reconfigure your entire /etc, access to sockets like docker's, or some other insane level of over reach I doubt even the least educated docker user would do.
While of course they should be scoped properly, people act like some elusive 0-day container escape will get used on their minecraft server or personal blog that has otherwise sane mounts, non-admin capabilities, etc. You arent that special.
And a shocking number of tutorials recommend bind-mounting docker.sock into the container without any warning (some even tell you to mount it "ro" -- which is even funnier since that does nothing). I have a HN comment from ~8 years ago complaining about this.
Thanks for mentioning it - but now... how does one deal with this?
* but if you’re used to bind-mounting, they’ll be a hassle
Edit: This is by no means comprehensive, but I feel compelled to point it out specifically for some reason: remember not to mount .git writable, folks! Write access to .git is arbitrary code execution as whoever runs git.
You might still want to tighten things up. Just adding on the "rootless" part - running the container runtime as an unprivileged user on the host instead of root - you also want to run npm/node as unprivileged user inside the container. I still see many defaulting to running as root inside the container since that's the default of most images. OP touches on this.
For rootless podman, this will run as a user with your current uid and map ownership of mounts/volumes:
non necessary vulnerability per. se. Bridged adapter for example lets you do a lot - few years ago there were a story of something like how a guy got a root in container and because the container used bridged adapter he was able to intercept traffic of an account info updates on GCP
Imagine naming this executable "ls" or "echo" and someone having "." in their path (which is why you shouldn't): as long as you do "ls" in this directory, you've ran compromised code.
There are obviously other ways to get that executable to be run on the host, this just a simple example.
OTH if I had written such a script for linux I'd be looking to grab the contents of $(hist) $(env) $(cat /etc/{group,passwd})... then enumerate /usr/bin/ /usr/local/bin/ and the XDG_{CACHE,CONFIG} dirs - some plaintext credentials are usually here.
The $HOME/.{aws,docker,claude,ssh}
Basically the attacker just needs to know their way around your OS. The script enumerating these directories is the 0777 script they were able to write from inside the root access container.
Go and Rust tend to lend themselves to these more restrictive environments a bit better than other options.
Assume that the malware has replaced system commands, possibly used a kernel vulnerability to lie to you to hide its presence, so do not do anything in the infected system directly ?
"CVE-2025-66478 - Next.js/Puppeteer RCE)"
If you have decent network or process level monitoring, you're likely to find it, while you might not realize the vulnerable software itself or some stealthier, more dangerous malware that might exploit it.
From the root container, depending on volume mounts and capabilities granted to the container, they would enumerate the host directories and find the names of common scripts and then overwrite one such script. Or to be even sneakier, they can append their malicious code to an existing script in the host filesystem. Now each time you run your script, their code piggybacks.
OTOH if I had written such a script for linux I'd be looking to grab the contents of $(hist) $(env) $(cat /etc/{group,passwd})... then enumerate /usr/bin/ /usr/local/bin/ and the XDG_{CACHE,CONFIG} dirs - some plaintext credentials are usually here. The $HOME/.{aws,docker,claude,ssh} Basically the attacker just needs to know their way around your OS. The script enumerating these directories is the 0777 script they were able to write from inside the root access container.
Deleting and remaking the container will blow away all state associated with it. So there isn't a whole lot to worry about after you do that.
Search engines try to fight slop results with collateral damage mostly in small or even personal websites. Restaurants are happy to be on one platform only: Google Maps. Who needs an expensive website if you're on there and someone posts your menu as one of the pictures? (Ideally an old version so the prices seem cheaper and you can't be pinned down for false advertising.) Open source communities use Github, sometimes Gitlab or Codeberg, instead of setting up a Forgejo (I host a ton of things myself but notice that the community effect is real and also moved away from self hosting a forge). The cherry in top is when projects use Discord chats as documentation and bug reporting "form". Privacy people use Signal en masse, where Matrix is still as niche as it was when I first heard of it. The binaries referred to as open source just because they're downloadable can be found on huggingface, even the big players use that exclusively afaik. Some smaller projects may be hosted on Github but I have yet to see a self-hosted one. Static websites go on (e.g. Github) Pages and back-ends are put on Firebase. Instead of a NAS, individuals as well as small businesses use a storage service like Onedrive or Icloud. Some more advanced users may put their files on Backblaze B2. Those who newly dip their toes in self-hosting increasingly use a relay server to reach their own network, not because they need it but to avoid dealing with port forwarding or setting up a way to privately reach internal services. Security cameras are another good example of this: you used to install it, set a password, and forward the port so you can watch it outside the home. Nowadays people expect that "it just works" on their phone when they plug it in, no matter where they are. That this relies on Google/Amazon and that they can watch all the feeds is acceptable for the convenience. And that's all not even mentioning the death of the web: people who don't use websites anymore the way they were meant (as hyperlinked pages) but work with an LLM as their one-stop shop
Not that the increased convenience, usability, and thus universal accessibility of e.g. storage and private chats is necessarily bad, but the trend doesn't seem to me as you seem to think it is
I can't think of any example of something that became increasingly often self-hosted instead of less across the last 1, 5, or 10 years
If you see a glimmer of hope for the distributed internet, do share because I feel increasingly as the last person among my friends who hosts their own stuff
I've been on the receiving end of attacks that were reported to be the size of more than 10tbps I couldn't imagine how I would deal with that if I didn't have a 3rd party providing such protection - it would require millions $$ a year just in transit contracts.
There is an increasing amount of software that attempts to reverse this, but as someone from https://thingino.com/ said: opensource is riddled with developers that died to starvation (nobody donates to opensource projects).
But I am interested in the monero aspect here.
Should I treat this as some datapoint on monero’s security having held up well so far?
If you used the server to mine Bitcoin, you would make approximately zero (0) profit, even if somebody else pays for the server.
But also yes, Monero has technically held up very well.
That said, do you have an image of the box or a container image? I'm curious about it.
I was lucky in that my DB backups were working so all my persistence wax backed up to S3. I think I could stand up another one in an hour.
Unfortunately I didn't keep an image no. I almost didn't have the foresight to investigate before yeeting the whole box into the sun!
Re: the Internet.
Re: Peer-to-peer.
Re: Video streaming.
Re: AI.
And maybe updating container images with a mechanism similar to renovate with "minimumReleaseTime=7days" or something similar!?
Easier said than done, I know.
Podman makes it easier to be more secure by default than Docker. OpenShift does too, but that's probably taking things too far for a simple self hosted app.
Then you need to run things with as least privilege as possible. Sadly, Docker and containers in general are an anti-pattern here because they’re about convenience first, security second. So the OP should have run the contains as read-only with tight resource limits and ideally IP restrictions on access if it’s not a public service.
Another thing you can do is use Tailscale, or something like it, to keep things being a zero trust, encrypted, access model. Not suitable for public services of course.
And a whole host of other things.
> Here’s the test. If /tmp/.XIN-unix/javae exists on my host, I’m fucked. If it doesn’t exist, then what I’m seeing is just Docker’s default behavior of showing container processes in the host’s ps output, but they’re actually isolated.
1. Files of running programs can be deleted while the program is running. If the program were trying to hide itself, it would have deleted /tmp/.XIN-unix/javae after it started. The nonexistence of the file is not a reliable source of information for confirming that the container was not escaped.
2. ps shows program-controlled command lines. Any program can change what gets displayed here, including the program name and arguments. If the program were trying to hide itself, it would change this to display `login -fp ubuntu` instead. This is not a reliable source of information for diagnosing problems.
It is good to verify the systemd units and crontab, and since this malware is so obvious, it probably isn't doing these two hiding methods, but information-stealing malware might not be detected by these methods alone.
Later, the article says "Write your own Dockerfiles" and gives one piece of useless advice (using USER root does not affect your container's security posture) and two pieces of good advice that don't have anything to do with writing your own Dockerfiles. "Write your own Dockerfiles" is not useful security advice.
I actually think it is. It makes you more intimate with the application and how it runs, and can mitigate one particular supply-chain security vector.
Agreeing that the reasoning is confused but that particular advice is still good I think.
And isn’t it a design flaw if you can see all processes from inside a container? This could provide useful information for escaping it.
But if they do have a vulnerability and manage to escape the sandbox then they will be root on your host.
Running your processes as an unprivileged user inside your containers reduces the possibility of escaping the sandbox, running your containers themselves as un unprivileged user (rootless podman or docker for example) reduces the attack surface when they manage to escape the sandbox.
You have to define a firewall policy and attach it to the VM.
Yikes. I would still recommend a server rebuild. That is _not_ a safe configuration in 2025, whatsoever. You are very likely to have a much better engineered persistent infection on that system.
The right thing to do is to roll out a new server (you have a declarative configuration right?), migrate pure data (or better, get it from the latest backup), remove the attacked machine off the internet to do a full audit. Both to learn about what compromises there are for the future and to inform users of the IoT platform if their data has been breached. In some countries, you are even required by law to report breaches. IANAL of course.
[*] https://aws.amazon.com/inspector/pricing/
I'm glad you're up to writing more of your own posts, though! I'm right there with you that writing is difficult, and I've definitely got some posts on similar topics up on my site that are overly long and meandering and not quite good, but that's fine because eventually once I write enough they'll hopefully get better.
Here's hoping I'll read more from you soon!
I tried handwriting https://blog.jakesaunders.dev/schemaless-search-in-postgres/ bit I thought it came off as rambling.
Maybe I'll have a go at redrafting this tomorrow in non LLM-ese.
> IT NEVER ESCAPED.
You haven't confirmed this (at least from the contents of the article). You did some reasonable spot checks and confirmed/corrected your understanding of the setup. I'd agree that it looks likely that it did not escape or gain persistence on your host but in no way have you actually verified this. If it were me I'd still wipe the host and set up everything from scratch again[0].
Also your part about the container user not being root is still misinformed and/or misleading. The user inside the container, the container runtime user, and whether container is privileged are three different things that are being talked about as one.
Also, see my comment on firewall: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46306974
[0]: Not necessarily drop-everything-you-do urgently but next time you get some downtime to do it calmly. Recovering like this is a good excercise anyway to make sure you can if you get a more critical situation in the future where you really need to. It will also be less time and work vs actually confirming that the host is uncontaminated.
I'm going to sit down and rewrite the article and take a further look at the container tomorrow.
At any rate, this happening to you sucks! Hugs from a fellow HN user, I know that things like this can suck up a lot of time and energy. It’s courageous to write about such an incident incident, I think it’s useful to a lot of other people too, kudos!
(And good to hear you're leaving the LLMs out of the writing next time <3)
At least that's what I think happened because I never found out exactly how it was compromised.
The miner was running as root and it's file was even hidden when I was running ls ! So I didn't understand what was happening, it was only after restarting my VPS from with a rescue image, and after mounting the root filesystem, that I found out the file I was seeing in the processes list did indeed exist.
Even if you are an owasp member who reads daily vulnerability reports, it's so easy to think you are unaffected.
It has since been fixed: Lesson learned.
But podman has also great integration with systemd. With that you could use a socket activated systemd unit, and stick the socket inside the container, instead of giving the container any network at all. And even if you want networking in the container, the podman folks developed slirp4netns, which is user space networking, and now something even better: passt/pasta.
Also rootless docker does not bypass ufw like rootful docker does.
I know we aren't supposed to rely on containers as a security boundary, but it sure is great hearing stories like this where the hack doesn't escape the container. The more obstacles the better I guess.
If the human involved can’t escalate, the hack can’t.
This became enough of a hassle that I stopped using them.
But yeah it is massively overspecced. Makes me feel cool load testing my go backend at 8000 requests per second though!
Also could prevent something to exfiltrate sensitive data.
js scripts running on frameworks running inside containers
PS so I see the host ended up staying uncompromised
> RandomX utilizes a virtual machine that executes programs in a special instruction set that consists of integer math, floating point math and branches. > These programs can be translated into the CPU's native machine code on the fly (example: program.asm). > At the end, the outputs of the executed programs are consolidated into a 256-bit result using a cryptographic hashing function (Blake2b).
I doubt that you anyone managed to create an ASIC that does this more efficiently and cost effective than a basic CPU. So, no, probably no one is mining Monero using an ASIC.
If they can enslave 100s or even 1000s of machine mining XMR for them, easy money if you set aside the legality of it.
E.g. on my systemd-nspawn setup with --private-users=pick (enables user namespacing) I created a container and gave it a bind mount. From the container it appears like files in the bind mount created by the container namespace's UID 0 are owned by UID 0 but from outside the container the same file looks owned by UID 100000. Inverted, files owned by the "real" UID 0 on the host look owned by 0 to the host but as owned by 65534 (i.e. "nobody") from the container's perspective. Breaking out of the container shouldn't inherently change the "actual" user of the process from 100000 to 0 any more than breaking out of the container as a non-0 UID in the first place - same as breaking out of any of the other namespaces doesn't make the "UID 0" user in the container turn into "UID 0" on the host.
They also expose kernel interfaces that, if exploited, can lead to the same.
In the end, namespaces are just for partitioning resources, using them for sandboxes can work, but they aren't really sandboxes.
b) if you want to limit your hosting environment to only the language/program you expect to run you should provision with unikernels which enforce it
>Edit: A few people on HN have pointed out that this article sounds a little LLM generated. That’s because it’s largely a transcript of me panicking and talking to Claude. Sorry if it reads poorly, the incident really happened though!
For what it's worth, this is not an excuse, and I still don't appreciate being fed undisclosed slop. I'm not even reading it.
Next year is the 5th year of my current personal project. Ten to go.
They have done it to others.
An inbound firewall can only help protect services that aren't meant to be reachable on the public internet. This service was exposed to the internet intentionally so a firewall wouldn't have helped avoid the breach.
The lesson to me is that keeping up with security updates helps prevent publicly exposed services from getting hacked.
Is there ever a reason someone should run a docker container as root ?
Unless ran as root this could return file not found because of missing permissions, and not just because the file doesn't actually exist, right?
> “I don’t use X” doesn’t mean your dependencies don’t use X
That is beyond obvious, and I don't understand how anyone would feel safe from reading about a CVE on a widely used technology when they run dozens of containers on their server. I have docker containers and as soon as I read the article I went and checked because I have no idea what technology most are built with.
> No more Umami. I’m salty. The CVE was disclosed, they patched it, but I’m not running Next.js-based analytics anymore.
Nonsensical reaction.
Nothing is immune. What analytics are you going to run? If you roll your own you'll probably leave a hole somewhere.
But kudos for the word play!
Backend access trivial with Tailscale, etc.
Cloudflare can certainly do more (e.g. protect against DoS and hide your personal IP if your server is at home).
But that alone would not solve the problem being a RCE from HTTP, that is why edge proxy provider like Cloudflare[0] and Fastfy[1] proactivily added protections in his WAF products.
Even cloudflare had an outage trying to protect his customers[3].
- [0] https://blog.cloudflare.com/waf-rules-react-vulnerability/ - [1] https://www.fastly.com/blog/fastlys-proactive-protection-cri... - [2] https://blog.cloudflare.com/5-december-2025-outage/
Backend access trivial with Tailscale, etc.
Public IP never needs to be used. You can just leave it an internal IP if you really want.
DNS is no issue. External DNS can be handled by Cloudflare and their waf. Their DNS service can can obsfucate your public IP, or ideally not need to use it at all with a Cloudflare tunnel installed directly on the server. This is free.
Backend access trivial with Tailscale, etc.
Public IP doesn't always need to be used. You can just leave it an internal IP if you really want.
I use them for self-hosting.
If you are using Cloudflare's DNS they can hide your IP on the dns record but it would still have to be locked down but some folks find ways to tighten that up too.
If you're using a bare metal server it can be broken up.
It's fair that it's a 3rd party's castle. At the same time until you know how to run and secure a server, some services are not a bad idea.
Some people run pangolin or nginx proxy manager on a cheap vps if it suits their use case which will securely connect to the server.
We are lucky that many of these ideas have already been discovered and hardened by people before us.
Even when I had bare metal servers connected to the internet, I would put a firewall like pfsense or something in between.
If I run vulnerable software, it will still be vulnerable through a Cloudflare tunnel, right?
Genuinely interested, I'm always scared to expose things to the internet :-).
Free way - sign up for a cloudflare account. Use the DNS on cloudflare, they wil put their public ip in front of your www.
Level 2 is install the cloudflare tunnel software on your server and you never need to use the public IP.
Backend access securely? Install Tailscale or headscale.
This should cover most web hosting scenarios. If there's additional ports or services, tools like nginx proxy manager (web based) or others can help. Some people put them on a dedicated VPS as a jump machine.
This way using the Public IP can almost be optional and locked down if needed. This is all before running a firewall on it.
Keeping the IP secret seems like a misnomer.
Its often possible to lock down the public IP entirely to not accept connections except what's initiated from the inside (like the cloudflare tunnel or otherwise reaching out).
Something like a Cloudflare+tunnel on one side, tailscale or something to get into it on the other.
Folks other than me have written decent tutorials that have been helpful.